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Who’s Afraid of the Federal Circuit?
Jonathan Masur’s argument regarding “Patent Inflation” rests on the assumption
that PTO behavior is determined almost entirely by a desire to avoid reversal of its
patent denials by the Federal Circuit. Although the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) is certainly a weak agency over which the Federal Circuit has
considerable power, Masur overestimates the extent to which high-level PTO
administrators are concerned about Federal Circuit reversals and underestimates
institutional influences that are likely to operate in a deflationary direction. The PTO
is influenced not only by the Federal Circuit and other inflationary forces, but also by
executive branch actors, industry players, and workload concerns that push in a
deflationary direction.
introduction
Jonathan Masur’s very interesting article, Patent Inflation,1 argues that the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) will be significantly more likely, even
under the Federal Circuit’s relatively permissive approach to patentability, to
issue false positives than false negatives—that is, more likely to grant patents
for illegitimate claims than to deny patents for legitimate ones. In contrast to
prior scholarship that has made similar points, Masur argues that this result
can be derived strictly from a parsimonious model of the interaction between
the PTO and the Federal Circuit. This model rests on several assumptions, of
which the most important is that the PTO is almost entirely concerned with
being reversed by the Federal Circuit. Not only is the PTO required to follow
Federal Circuit pronouncements on substantive law strictly,2 but the Federal
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Circuit “holds the power to significantly and directly affect the interests of the
PTO’s administrators.”3
Specifically, Masur posits that PTO administrators will be motivated by a
desire to avoid direct reversals by the Federal Circuit. Moreover, because the ex
parte nature of patent examination creates a situation where direct reversals
occur almost entirely in the context of patent denials, the agency will be
extremely cautious about such denials. It will refuse to deny patents in any
situation where a patent denial could conceivably be reversed by any threejudge panel of the Federal Circuit. Although a variety of pressures will deter
the agency from granting all patent applications, the PTO will still produce
many more false positives than false negatives.4
Masur does note the possibility of other pressures on the PTO. These
include Congress, the President, and private interests. But he says that “it is
unlikely that [these] interests exert a strong pull on PTO behavior.”5 As an
institutional corrective, Masur proposes much more robust implementation of
administrative proceedings (such as opposition proceedings) that allow third
parties to contest a patent application fully. Because third parties would
presumably appeal to the Federal Circuit if their administrative opposition was
unsuccessful, frequent use of such proceedings would allow the PTO to be
reversed directly—not simply when it denies patents but also when it sustains
patents.6 Masur’s suggestion is quite timely, as Congress has finally—after
many years of debate—implemented legislation that sets up full-blown trialtype proceedings for third parties that want to oppose patents.7
I agree with aspects of Masur’s argument. Indeed, I have argued that,
because patent denials are more likely to represent true negatives than patent
grants are to represent true positives, PTO denials and grants should be treated
asymmetrically by reviewing courts.8 Additionally, the PTO’s relative weakness
as an agency cannot be denied. Unlike most agencies with portfolios involving
complex technological and scientific problems, the PTO does not have
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See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299-305
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rulemaking authority over the substantive questions that it addresses.9 The
Federal Circuit appears to have taken this lack of rulemaking authority to mean
that the PTO is entitled to no deference on any of its views of substantive law
or policy (including views that may be expressed in adjudication of individual
patents).10
I believe, however, that Masur both overestimates the extent to which
high-level PTO administrators are concerned about Federal Circuit reversals
and underestimates institutional influences that are likely to operate in a
deflationary direction (i.e., to effect a contraction in the bounds of
patentability). As to the first point, the history of patent law since the creation
of the Federal Circuit is, in significant part, a history of expansion through
Federal Circuit reversal of PTO patent denials. Of course, a single reversal—
particularly in an area with little prior precedent—may simply represent the
PTO guessing incorrectly about the Federal Circuit’s preferences. But repeated
PTO attempts to argue against the Federal Circuit cannot be explained away so
easily. In at least three key doctrinal areas—the application of the
nonobviousness requirement to biotechnology, the patentable subject matter
inquiry for mathematical algorithm patents, and the so-called “teaching,
suggestion, or motivation” test for combining prior art to show obviousness—
the PTO has made such repeated attempts. One explanation for these actions is
that, from the agency’s standpoint, certain deflationary readings of
patentability requirements reduce workload pressure and enhance overall
reputational capital without unduly distressing patent applicants and industry
players.
To be sure, concerns about workload and reputation may go only so far. In
each case noted above, the PTO ultimately capitulated. And it appears to have
capitulated without even attempting to appeal the Federal Circuit reversal to
the Supreme Court. This pattern appears to be changing, however. Not only is
the PTO influenced by other executive branch actors participating in certain
appeals directly, it is also regularly filing Supreme Court amicus briefs that take
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See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers . . . does NOT grant the Commissioner
the authority to issue substantive rules.” (quoting Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,
1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (alteration and capitalization in Therasense) (citation omitted in
Therasense)).
For an extended discussion of the PTO’s lack of substantive rulemaking authority and of the
Federal Circuit’s refusal to apply deference to PTO decisionmaking on substantive law or
policy, see Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 293-308 (2007).
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positions contrary to those taken by the Federal Circuit. In many of these cases,
the PTO’s positions point in a deflationary direction.
Perhaps most interestingly, the PTO has in several cases actively exploited
ambiguity in Federal Circuit case law to write ex ante guidelines that operate in
a deflationary direction. In one of these cases, the PTO was pushed by agencies
that tend to be wary of patents. Another case involved industries where
relevant players are interested in at least a limited form of deflation. All in all,
we see indications of the PTO positioning itself not as an agent of the Federal
Circuit but, instead, as a potential competitor that is sometimes interested in
deflation.
My account in this short response is positive, not normative. I explore
normative issues at length elsewhere.11 Briefly, however, if one’s normative
goal is patent deflation, the deflationary effect certain executive branch and
industry actors appear to have had on PTO positions would suggest bolstering
further the influence of these other actors.
i. (repeated) federal circuit reversal of pto patent
denials
Since 1982, when the Federal Circuit was created, a significant percentage
of patent law expansion has occurred in the context of Federal Circuit reversal
of PTO patent denials. As noted above, a single reversal—even in a salient
case—may simply reflect the PTO’s misapprehension of the Federal Circuit’s
position. The same cannot be said for salient disputes where the PTO presses
its position repeatedly. In the 1980s and 1990s, a pattern of repeated reversals
emerged in two flagship areas of technological inquiry: biotechnology and
software. In addition, starting in the 1990s, the Federal Circuit repeatedly
reversed the PTO’s attempts to demonstrate that prior art could be combined
to show nonobviousness even in cases where the art did not reveal a specific
documentary “teaching, suggestion, or motivation.”12
In the 1993 case In re Bell,13 the PTO pressed the argument that, for the
average scientist working in the area, knowing a general method for selecting
genes through the use of nucleotide probes, as well as the complete or partial
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Arti K. Rai, Patentability Policy Across the Executive Branch: What the DNA Patent Controversies
Teach About Institutional Choice, 61 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
The “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test is stated in In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002). KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), criticized
the Federal Circuit’s strict application of this test. Id. at 415.
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amino acid of the protein for which a gene of interest coded, would render the
DNA base sequence for the gene obvious.14 The Federal Circuit in that case
dismissed as largely irrelevant the PTO’s assessment of biotechnological
science.15 The court instead invoked analogies to chemical synthesis, analogies
that had the effect of reducing nonobviousness in biotechnology to a novelty
standard.16 Faced with a decision that might significantly increase the flow of
dubious patent applications, the PTO redoubled its efforts. Two years later, in
In re Deuel,17 the agency made its case again. In once again rejecting the PTO,
the Deuel opinion pointedly cited to Bell.18
Another notable example of the PTO repeatedly holding the line on
patentability occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s with respect to
software as patentable subject matter. In two controversies, the 1989 case of In
re Iwahashi19 and the 1994 case of In re Alappat,20 the PTO determined that the
“means-plus-function” claims in question—essentially, claims to any computer
“means” that could perform particular mathematical functions—did not
represent patentable subject matter. According to the PTO, applications that
could encompass (as these applications did) any general-purpose computer
represented unpatentable mathematical algorithms.21 In both cases, the Federal
Circuit reversed.22 The Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion in Alappat chastised
the PTO for ignoring statements in Iwahashi and other Federal Circuit
opinions stating that claims written in “means-plus-function” format must be
construed as strictly limited by physical structures recited in the specification.23
The en banc court’s displeasure may have been enhanced by the fact that highlevel PTO administrators had stacked the appellate process within the PTO so
as to ensure a rejection of the Alappat patent.24
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Id. at 783.
Id. at 784.
See id.
51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1559 (“The PTO’s focus on known methods for potentially isolating the claimed DNA
molecules is also misplaced because the claims at issue define compounds, not methods.”
(citing Bell, 991 F.2d at 785)).
888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Id. at 1539; Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1371.
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545; Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1371.
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1539.
See id. at 1530-36 (discussing the PTO’s decision to set up an expanded appeals panel that
overturned the original appellate panel’s decision finding patentable subject matter).
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Perhaps the most dramatic example of the PTO repeatedly being rebuffed
by the Federal Circuit involved the requirement by many three-judge panels
that PTO examiners identify a specific documentary “teaching, suggestion, or
motivation” to combine prior art references when using these references for
purposes of demonstrating obviousness. In cases spread over several years,25
the PTO argued that its examiners should not always have to point to
documentary evidence indicating that particular references should be
combined. Rather, in keeping with pre-Federal Circuit case law on official
notice,26 examiners should be able to invoke their own knowledge of what
constitutes ordinary skill in the art. Although Federal Circuit panels were not
unanimous in rejecting the PTO’s desire to rely on “common knowledge and
common sense,” a large number of panels penned excoriating opinions.27 An
agency that wanted to avoid reversal would (at least after the first opinion)
have avoided all reference to common sense.
Of course, the PTO could have tried to appeal these repeated reversals on
obviousness and patentable subject matter to the Supreme Court. Rather than
appealing, the agency did ultimately capitulate. Whether this failure to appeal
emerged from timidity on the part of the PTO or from an inability to convince
the Department of Justice’s Office of the Solicitor General that the Supreme
Court would be interested in an appeal is unclear.28 In any event, both the
Supreme Court and the Solicitor General would begin to show interest starting
in the late 1990s.
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ii. the emergence of p atent law (and the p t o) at the
supreme court
As John Duffy observed in a recent article,29 the Supreme Court’s renewed
interest in patent law has, ironically enough, been associated with an assertion
of power by the executive branch. The executive branch—led by the Solicitor
General—has participated either as a party or as an amicus in sixteen of the
eighteen patent law cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1996. In ten of
the sixteen cases, the Solicitor General disagreed squarely with the Federal
Circuit. In all but one of these ten cases, the Solicitor General won out over the
Federal Circuit.30
Most notably for present purposes, the PTO co-authored the government
brief in fifteen of the sixteen cases involving Solicitor General participation.31 In
nine of these cases, the PTO put itself on record as disagreeing with the Federal
Circuit. And the PTO has been on the winning side of all nine of these cases.
Five of the nine cases—Dickinson v. Zurko,32 Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc.,33 KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,34 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,35
and Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.36—point in a deflationary
direction.
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John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 518 (2010).
These statistics are derived from updating Figure 8 in Professor Duffy’s article, id. at 539,
with the result in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), which was not decided at the time
of the article’s publication, as well as with three patent cases decided in the Court’s 2010
Term: Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); and
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
See Duffy, supra note 29, at 540. In addition to the cases cited by Duffy, the PTO coauthored the government’s brief in i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238, and Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2060. The
single exception is Roche Molecular Systems, 131 S. Ct. 2188, a case involving a statute (the
Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)) administered not by the PTO but by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
527 U.S. 150 (1999).
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
550 U.S. 437 (2007).
553 U.S. 617 (2008).
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For purposes of PTO power (and day-to-day operations), two victories
over the Federal Circuit stand out.37 The first was the Supreme Court decision
in Dickinson v. Zurko.38 In this case, to which the PTO was a party, the
Supreme Court held that, because the PTO was an agency subject to the
ordinary requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), its factfinding in patent denials was to be reviewed under highly deferential APA
standards.39
Perhaps even more important was the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.40 In that case, the government filed an
amicus brief detailing the ways in which a rigid requirement that examiners (or
district courts) show “teaching, suggestion, or motivation”—particularly in
documentary form—posed an unnecessary burden and was contrary to
accepted administrative law principles of official notice.41 In a unanimous
opinion, the Supreme Court agreed.42
In KSR, the Supreme Court discussed briefly the longstanding patent law
principle that although an invention that is “obvious to try” is not necessarily
obvious, it can be obvious if the universe of possible solutions is finite and
predictable.43 Although the Bell through Deuel line of cases discussed above was
only nominally concerned with obvious-to-try jurisprudence (instead, the cases
took the formalist position that methods are not appropriate prior art for
claims drawn to chemical compounds), the PTO seized upon this short
discussion to set up a test case, In re Kubin.44 In its 2009 Kubin decision, the
Federal Circuit unanimously agreed with the PTO and finally interred Bell and
Deuel.45 Thus, the PTO, in tandem with the Solicitor General and the Supreme
Court, has pushed the Federal Circuit in a deflationary direction.

37.

Although Medimmune, 549 U.S. 118, Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437, and Quanta, 553 U.S. 617, all
limit the power of the patent holder, they do not address the issues of patent application
validity decided by the PTO.
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Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21-24, KSR, 550 U.S.
398 (No. 04-1350).
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iii. exploiting ambiguity in federal circuit j urisprudence
At the level of the Supreme Court appeal, the PTO has clearly been
influenced by (and perhaps emboldened by) other executive branch actors.
Supreme Court appeals are, however, perhaps the very definition of ex post
policymaking. Ex post, the available policy space is often quite constrained.
Even though the “patents are property rights” trope has many limitations,
courts are legitimately concerned by the fact that they act quite late in the
game, with the potential for significantly disturbing reasonable, investmentbacked expectations. For this reason, arguably the most interesting moves by
the PTO have involved attempts to shape the debate ex ante, even in the
absence of rulemaking authority over validity requirements.
Many of these PTO attempts have been in the life sciences. Here the
executive branch actors that have emboldened the PTO have been the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the National Institutes
of Health (NIH). In the early 1990s, the NIH first raised the question of
whether innovation goals would be served by patents on gene-related research
that was several steps upstream from a full gene of known biological
function.46 By the late 1990s, the NIH had come to a conclusion. As large
numbers of patent applications drawn to gene fragments of unknown
biological function began to be filed, the NIH (and its expert consultants)
sounded an alarm over the transaction-cost impediments that requirements to
license numerous upstream patents could pose for subsequent research.47 As a
doctrinal matter, the NIH was concerned that these patent applications did not
meet the utility requirement for patentability.48
Although the PTO was initially resistant—perhaps because the Federal
Circuit had recently rebuffed it for interpreting utility too strictly in the 1995
Brana case49—a consequence of consistent NIH pressure was PTO guidelines

46.
47.

See Bernadine Healy, Special Report on Gene Patenting, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 664, 665
(1992).
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998). At the time, Professor
Rebecca Eisenberg was an expert consultant to the NIH.
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Cf. Harold Varmus, Government, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
AND
THE
DISSEMINATION
OF
RESEARCH
TOOLS
IN
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, FEBRUARY 15-16, 1996, at 66, 68 (1997) (expressing concern that
applications did not meet utility requirement), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=5758.

49.

In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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(proposed in 1999 and finalized in 2001)50 that raised the patentability bar
posed by the utility requirement. These guidelines, upheld by the Federal
Circuit in its 2005 In re Fisher decision,51 allowed the PTO summarily to reject
all claims to gene fragments of unknown biological function. Particularly given
the contemporaneous Bell through Deuel line of case law that effectively
eliminated the non-obviousness requirement in genomics, the PTO’s utility
guidelines appear to have been important in forestalling the development of a
genomic patent thicket.52
Despite accepting the PTO’s utility guidelines in In re Fisher, in keeping
with its traditional approach, the Federal Circuit accorded the agency no
deference.53 It also dismissed as irrelevant policy arguments made by the PTO
and its many academic and industry amici regarding how a strict interpretation
of the utility standard had thwarted the formation of patent thickets.54
Nonetheless, it seems plausible that the PTO had created favorable facts on the
ground that would be difficult for the Federal Circuit to overturn.
On occasion, the PTO has also acted ex ante of its own accord. In recent
years, many industry players have complained about how poorly claims on
issued patents, particularly in information technology (IT), perform their
notice function. Given the volume of complaints from important industry
players, a response by the PTO was not surprising. Thus, in a prominent 2008
case, Ex Parte Miyazaki,55 the PTO determined that examiners should find a
patent claim “indefinite” (and thus reject it) if the claim is “amenable to two or
more plausible claim constructions.”56 This interpretation of the indefiniteness
requirement is significantly stricter than that applied by the Federal Circuit.
The PTO justified its approach by noting that Federal Circuit precedent
permits the agency to treat claims differently in prosecution than would courts
in litigation because applicants have an opportunity to amend claims in
prosecution.57 The Miyazaki approach was recently expanded and further
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Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001); Revised Utility
Examination Guidelines; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440 (Dec. 21, 1999).
421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See Michael M. Hopkins et al., DNA Patenting: The End of an Era?, 25 NATURE
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Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372.
Id. at 1378.
No. 2007-3300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19, 2008).
Id. at 1211.
Id.
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elucidated in guidelines.58 In this case, because the industry most affected by
the guidelines (IT) favors at least a limited form of deflation, the PTO was able
to bolster its reputational capital by acting in a deflationary manner.
conclusion
By noting deflationary institutional pressures for which Professor Masur
does not account, I do not mean to suggest that we have reached any sort of
optimum level of patenting. How one might assess optimality (or even a
second-best solution) is a complicated question that I address in a longer
article.59 Moreover, although I have identified cases in which workload and
reputational concerns operated in a deflationary direction, one could also
imagine many cases in which the easy response was simply to grant patents.
But if we believe further deflation is necessary, one systematic institutional
corrective might involve not only greater use of opposition proceedings within
the PTO (Professor Masur’s preferred choice), but also empowerment of nonPTO players who tend to be warier of patents than the median patent insider.
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